THE Economics of Match-Fixing by Caruso, Raul
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
THE Economics of Match-Fixing
Raul Caruso
May 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3085/
MPRA Paper No. 3085, posted 5. May 2007
 1
THE ECONOMICS OF MATCH-FIXING 
Raul Caruso 
Institute of Economic Policy 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano 
raul.caruso@unicatt.it 
 
Abstract 
The phenomenon of match-fixing does constitute a constant element of sport contests. This 
paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain it. The intuition behind is that an 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading  to match-fixing. In sum, 
this paper considers a partial equilibrium model of contest where two asymmetric, rational 
and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common 
contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome 
of the contest. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘contest 
management’ – namely efforts paving the way for a match-fixing. In particular, it will be 
demonstrated that, under some conditions, an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can 
lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to a match-fixing. Eventually the 
intuitions and results of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA 
World Cup and the UEFA Champions League tournaments. 
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Introduction 
Match-fixing in sport contests is a recurring and never-ending phenomenon. History of 
football provides several examples. In 1915 a match between Manchester United and 
Liverpool was fixed in Manchester’s favour. The United won 2-0 and avoided the relegation. 
In 1979, in the last match of the Italian Serie A championship, Juventus and Avellino 
probably fixed a match in Avellino’s favour. Avellino was in danger of relegation whilst 
Juventus was safely at the third place of the standing. Juventus was winning 3-0. Suddenly, 
Juventus’s headcoach Giovanni Trapattoni substituted the legendary Dino Zoff  - the most 
important goalkeeper at that time – with the unknown substitute goalkeeper called Giancarlo 
Alessandrelli. Then, Avellino scored three times in twenty minutes and avoided more quietly 
a possible relegation.  
However, the most famous example is perhaps the match between West Germany and 
Austria in 1982 World Cup. They both qualified to the second round at the expense of 
Algeria which had surprisingly beaten West Germany.  Under the rules of the tournament, 
Algeria played its last match the day before West Germany and Austria. Then, before playing 
the two german-speaking teams had the opportunity to know in advance the best outcome for 
both of them. If Germany had won by 1 or 2 goals both teams would have qualified. They 
did. West Germany won 1-0 and qualified. That result strongly affected the outcome of 
World Cup. Italy won the World Cup and West Germany was the runner-up. 
The common element emerging in these examples is that match-fixing arose because of  
the tournament design. Of course, this is not a novel statement. In fact, match-fixing is 
considered somehow predictable in European-style leagues with promotion and relegation. At 
the end of the season whenever one team is in the mid-table and the opponent is in danger of 
relegation last matches appear to be naturally in favour of the latter. To the first team the 
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match is meaningless whereas for the opponent it is worth one entire season. Preston and 
Szymanski (2003) already pointed out that: “[…]Bribing opponents usually happens because 
the rewards for winning are highly asymmetric. This can happen in tournaments where one 
team has already qualified for a later stage of competition. In leagues with promotion and 
relegation there are often accusations of match fixing at the end of a season where one team 
in match is in danger of relegation[…]”[p.618]. This is also in line with Duggan and Levitt 
(2002). In this study the authors find out a form of reciprocity in Japanese Sumo based upon 
– among other elements - the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake in the final match of a 
tournament.    
However, in the presence of a high asymmetry in the evaluation of the contested stake, 
it could be maintained that the boundary between match-fixing and an ordinary lack of 
commitment is often undistinguishable. The low-evaluation player could simply exert less 
efforts than a very motivated player. The aim of this paper is that of providing a simple 
formal model in order to explain the occurrence of match-fixing between teams retaining 
different evaluations of the stake. Moreover, the model presented also proposes a tentative 
differentiating feature between match-fixing and lack-of-commitment and how they could be 
linked. In order to do that, I enrich a traditional contest model and I shall consider the 
existence of a second kind of efforts that players have at their disposal. The intuition behind 
is quite simple. Football matches, as well as other sport contests, are rarely a simple 
exploitation of physical force and talent. Most sport contests and tournaments involve 
permanent communication and bargaining efforts between contenders. This can take different 
shapes and emerges in different occasions. Take the match. Players on the pitch speak each 
other. They also communicate through silent means. In fact, by means of a less intense 
commitment, players can simply ‘signal’ their willingness to exert less efforts and then to fix 
the result. Kicking aimlessly and lazily the ball around the pitch works in this respect. 
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However, in modern football, clubs meet and communicate very often. They also meet and 
interact frequently about transfers of players. At national level, they bargain almost everyday 
being involved in leagues which organize the tournaments. Moreover, what was traditionally 
common in domestic league is also becoming common at European level.   This kind of 
situation finds its analog in management of conflicts in the realm of international interactions 
between nation-states. In fact, most conflicts involve remarkable bargaining and 
communication efforts between the antagonists. Beyond violence, as applied when sending 
actual or potential threats, agents apply other instruments to successfully end any struggle. 
During a war, for example, the exploitation of actual violence is often interlinked with 
diplomatic efforts. Diplomatic negotiations are often conducted while troops are deployed on 
the battlefield. In international interactions, the exploitation of potential or actual violence 
cannot be disentangled from partial openings and cooperative behaviours.  
In general, the existence of this kind of behaviour suggests that players have at their 
disposal two kinds of efforts: (i) ‘pure contest’ and (ii) ‘contest management’ efforts. In a 
broader view, ‘contest management efforts’ can involve a wide spectrum of activities. For 
expository convenience, consider among others: (a) bargaining; (b) communication and 
strategic information transmission; (c) costly signaling. The two kinds of efforts are assumed 
to be complementary. Contestants are still rational utility-maximizers. Exerting less efforts 
may not correspond to ‘giving up’. In fact, they would exert efforts in ‘contest management’ 
if and only if they can get a higher payoff. The existence of ‘contest management’ efforts 
paves the way for the occurrence of match-fixing. In such a view, in general terms the 
phenomenon of match-fixing is nothing but a case of cooperation between agents involved in 
a wasteful conflict. At the same time, match-fixing is a phenomenon of cooperation which 
involves necessarily an element of threat and reciprocity. Consider that the existence of ‘pure 
contest’ efforts do constitute a kind of ‘credible threat’. Therefore, a mechanism of strong 
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reciprocity works. In such a view, whenever one of the contestants violates a silent (implicit)  
or declared match-fixing agreement, the opponent can punish it by exerting more ‘pure 
contest’ efforts. The characteristic feature of strong reciprocity is that the threatened 
punishment must be costly. This is in line with definition of strong reciprocity given in Gintis 
(2000).  
 This paper links with different strands of literature. Traditional contest models are 
formally grounded on Tullock (1980) and found seminal explanations in O’Keeffe et al. 
(1984), Rosen (1986) and Dixit (1987). Szymanksi (2003a) and Szymanki (2003b) 
expounded the application of contest theory to sport contests.   
In the theory of contest the use of a second instrument is not a novelty, although such 
approach has not been developed extensively. Consider among others the following studies. 
Baik and Shogran (1995) study a contest between players with unknown relative ability. 
Under the assumption of decreasing aversion to uncertain ability, agents are allowed to 
expend resources in order to reduce such uncertainty through spying. Konrad (2003) enriches 
a model of rent-seeking considering the interaction between two types of efforts: (i) the 
standard rent-seeking efforts to improve their own performance; (ii) a sabotaging effort in 
order to reduce the effectiveness of other agents’ efforts. In this model, sabotage is targeted 
towards a particular rival group and reduces this group’s performance. Through sabotage a 
group can increase its own probability of winning the prize as well as the other contestants’. 
Thus, the model predicts that sabotage disappears whenever the number of contestants 
becomes large. Caruso (2005) presents two different models of contest with two instruments. 
The analysis is applied to sport contests in order to consider the phenomena of match-fixing 
and doping. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2005) analyze in depth the equilibrium properties of a 
two-instrument contest model and compare the results to those attainable in standard one-
instrument models. In particular, this paper is close to a model proposed by Epstein and 
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Hefeker (2003), who model a contest where, the use of a second instrument creates an 
advantage for the player with the higher stake.  
Thirdly, this paper can also be linked to the literature of contests with asymmetric 
evaluations. Hillman and Riley (1989), Nti (1999/2004) analyses the case of a contest where 
participants evaluate differently the ‘prize’ – namely the stake. The common results of this 
contributions show that agents retaining a higher evaluation of the stake exert more efforts in 
the contest than the low-evaluation participants. In particular, Hillman and Riley show that 
asymmetric evaluation deters participation by low-evaluation agents.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In a first section a common contest 
model – allowing for different evaluation of the stake - is presented. In a second section the 
model is enriched in order to capture the existence of a second kind of effort. Then, through a 
classical mechanism of comparative statics the emergence of a Match-Fixing Region is 
explained. In a fourth section, a tentative calibration of the model is proposed. In particular, 
UEFA and FIFA tournament designs are analysed. A final section summarizes the results and 
discusses some policy implications.      
 
The ‘pure contest’ model 
Consider two risk-neutral teams, indexed by 21,=i . they have different evaluations of the 
contested stake denoted by ( )0, , 1, 2ix i∈ ∞ = . Given the asymmetry in evaluation, it would 
be possible to write that 1 2x x≠ where the subscripts indicate the evaluation of team 1 and 
team 2 respectively. In particular, hereafter assume that team 1 has a higher evaluation than 
team 2, namely 1 2x x> . Let ( )10,∈δ  denote the degree of asymmetry between the stakes of 
the two teams, namely ( ) 2 10,1 . .s t x xδ δ∃ ∈ = . For sake of notational simplicity, throughout 
the paper I shall use agent 1’s evaluation as a kind of numeraire and it will be simply denoted 
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by x .There is common knowledge about such hypotheses. Let a and b  denote the abilities 
for team 1 and team 2 respectively. Following the prevailing literature the outcome of a sport 
contest is determined through a Contest Success Function   (henceforth CSF for brevity). The 
probability of winning is given for team 1 and team 2 respectively by: 
( )
21
1
21 ,,, bCaC
aC
baCCpi +=          (1) 
( ) .,,,
21
2
212 bCaC
bC
baCCp +=         (2)  
Where 21 ,CC denote the exerted efforts by team 1 and team 2 respectively. The probability of 
winning of each team is increasing in its own effort and decreasing in the effort of the 
opponent. The functional form of CSF adopted in equation does not allow for a draw. Of 
course, this is a very strict limiting assumption when considering football. Anyway the focus 
on wins or losses also provides interesting insights. The existence of a draw could be 
captured through a modified form of the CSF as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004).  
However, the extended model in the next section would not be solved analytically. Then, for 
expository convenience I have chosen to stick to the traditional form of CSF. 
Because of the different evaluation of the stake the payoff functions for team 1 and 
team 2 are given respectively by: 
( ) ;, 1211 CxCCp −=π           (3) 
( ) 2212 , CxCCp −= δπ          (4) 
Following an ordinary maximization process the optimal choice of efforts in a match are 
given by: 
( ) xba
abC δδ 2
*
1 +=            (5) 
( ) xba
abC 22
*
2 δδ+=           (6) 
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And the level of total effort of the match is: 
( )
( ) xba
abCCTC δδ
δ
2
*
2
*
1
1
+
+=+=           (7) 
The payoffs accruing to the teams are: 
( ) xba
a
2
2
1 δπ +=            (8) 
( ) xba
b 3
2
2
2 δδπ +=           (9) 
The winning probabilities are: 
( ) ;, 211 δba
aCCp +=           (10) 
( ) ., 212 δ
δ
ba
bCCp +=           (11) 
It is simple to verify that δbapp >⇔> 21 . That is, in the extreme case of 1=δ  (no 
asymmetry) only the abilities have an impact upon the outcome of the contest. The more 
talented team will be the favourite while the less talented team will be the underdog.  
 
The extended model 
Now consider an extended model where teams have the option of choosing also an optimal 
level of ‘contest management’ efforts. Let ( )∞∈ ,0iF  with 2,1=i denote the level of ‘contest 
management’ efforts of  team 1 and team 2 respectively. The two kinds of effort are assumed 
to be complementary to each other. That is, the marginal payoff of an increase in ‘pure 
contest’ could be enhanced by a simultaneous increase in ‘contest management’. Hereafter 
the superscript ‘ F ’ will denote the ‘contest management’ scenario for all variables. When 
both teams exert efforts to ‘manage’ the contest there is also room for match-fixing. Let me 
assume that the contest management scenario can be sustained by means of a transfer. Such a 
transfer is measured in the same unit of both the efforts and the contested stake. Then, 
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suppose that such a transfer is worth a fraction of the optimal level of resources expended for 
contest management. Given no direct exchange, these transfers are assumed to take the shape 
of concessions. Let ( )1,01 ∈s  and ( )1,02 ∈s  denote the proportional concessions. They enter 
additively the payoff function of the contestants. A limited assumption is that the such 
reciprocal proportional concessions are treated as exogenously given. That is, I am not 
proposing any analytical explanation about the determination of them. I made this choice for 
analytical and expository convenience. In this setting, the CSF becomes: 
( )
( ) ( )11
1
2211
11
1 +++
+=
FbCFaC
FaCp F         (12) 
( )
( ) ( )11
1
2211
22
2 +++
+=
FbCFaC
FbCp F         (13) 
Eventually, assuming linear cost functions for ‘contest management’ efforts, the payoffs 
function are: 
221111 FsFCxp
FF +−−=π          (14) 
112222 FsFCxp
FF +−−= δπ           (15) 
Note that a concession proportional to the value of ‘contest management’ efforts enter the 
payoff functions of both teams. The optimal choices for both ‘pure contest’ efforts and 
‘contest management’ efforts are: 
( )
( )⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−=
−=
+=
+=
1
1
;
;
*
2
*
2
*
1
*
1
3
22
*
2
2
22
*
1
F
F
F
F
CF
CF
x
ba
abC
x
ba
abC
δδ
δδ
        (16) 
Note that the optimal level of ‘pure contest’ is unambiguously positive 0,0 *2
*
1 >> FF CC  
whereas it is clear that ( ) ( )222*1 /0 δδ abbaF +⇔>  and ( ) ( )322*2 /0 δδ abbaxF +>⇔> . 
That is, in order to have positive efforts in contest management the value of the stake must be 
sufficiently large. Since ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222322 // δδδδ abbaabba +>+ for 1≠δ  considering only the 
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positivity condition  for team 2’s contest management effort would suffice. Moreover, the 
team with the higher evaluation of the stake has a higher incentive to fix the result of the 
match. In fact *2
*
1 FF > .  The total level of ‘pure contest’ efforts is: 
( )
( )22
2
*
2
*
1
1
δ
δδ
ba
xabCCTC FFF +
+=+=         (17) 
Whenever teams spend efforts to manage the contest the level of total efforts is lower than in 
the pure contest scenario. That is, FTCTC > .  The winning probabilities are: 
.;
2
221 δ
δ
δ ba
bp
ba
ap FF +=+=          (18) 
where ( )2/12/131 /bapp FF <⇔> δ . The payoff of team 1 is given by: 
( ) ( )[ ]( )22 2
2
21
11 δ
δδπ
ba
sbaaxsF +
−++−=          (19) 
Note that:  
( ) ( )322*1 /0 δδπ babsF −>⇔> .       (19.1) 
In the extreme case of 02 =s , the condition becomes 02 >− δba .  
Payoff for team 2 is given by: 
( ) ( )[ ]( )22 1
32
12 1 δ
δδδπ
ba
sabxbsF +
−−+−=         (20) 
At the same time note that 
 ( ) 00 13*2 >−+⇔> δδπ sabF .               (20.1) 
If 01 =s the (20.1) condition becomes 02 <− δba . Considering (19.1) and (20.1) It would be 
trivial to underline that if 021 == ss there cannot be positive payoffs for both teams.  
 
Comparative statics 
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As noted above, the second scenario has to be incentive-compatible. Then both teams have to 
get higher payoffs. More formally 11 ππ >F  and 22 ππ >F . Recall (8), (9), (19) and (20) and use 
kba = , to write: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )2
2
222
2
2
3
11 1 k
xks
k
kskxF
+>−++
+−⇔> δδ
δδππ        (22) 
and  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )2
3
122
1
32
22 1 k
xs
k
kskxF
+>−++
+−⇔> δ
δ
δ
δδδππ        (23) 
For sake of simplicity, hereafter I set an arbitrary value for the stake, 100=x . Then consider 
first team 1 and look at the parameter space ( )2, sδ  plotted below. 
FIGURE 1- RATIONALITY OF CONTEST MANAGEMENT FOR TEAM 1 ( 100=x ) 
 
All the points on the left of each curve represent the set of possible combinations of δ  and 
2s that make team 1 willing to manage the contest. It is clear that in the extreme case of 
02 =s , the boundary of the set would be represented by a vertical line denoting 48.=δ , 
56.=δ  and 59.=δ respectively for 2/1=k , 1=k , 2/3=k . That is, in general for 02 =s  
and a fixed value of k , there is a critical level δ~ such that for δδ ~>  team 1’s willingness to 
fix the match vanishes. However such willingness to manage the contest vanishes unless team 
 12
2 doe not provide the opponent with a sufficient proportional concession. In sum, the plot 
reports the boundary of a rationality condition. Figure 2 below reports the same for team 2.      
FIGURE 2 – RATIONALITY OF CONTEST MANAGEMENT  FOR TEAM 2 
  
As noted above for team 1, for 01 =s  and a fixed value of k , there is a critical level δ~ such 
that for δδ ~>  team 2’s willingness to fix the match vanishes. However such willingness to 
manage the contest vanishes unless team 1 does not provide the opponent with a sufficient 
proportional concession. The interesting point is that, for a fixed value of k , critical values of 
δ  allowing for a contest management scenario are lower than those of team 1. That is, the 
team with a higher evaluation of the stake has to influence team 2’s behaviour by means of a 
positive concession.  
As noted above, a match-fixing region is attainable if and only if 
2
*
211
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1 ,,0,0,0,0 ππππππ >>>>>> FFFFFF . Then recall  (19.1), (20.1), (22) and (23), 
and set again an arbitrary value both for x  and k .  
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FIGURE 3 – MATCH-FIXING REGION (MFR) AND ASYMMETRY IN EVALUATION 
 
Figure 3 show the MFR for 100=x  and 2/1=k . The MFR is the area delimited by ABC. 
That is, team 1, namely the team with a higher evaluation of the stake has also lower abilities.  
The vertical line indicating 18.0=δ  represents the condition 0*2 >F , namely  
( ) ( )322 / δδ abbax +> , for 100=x and 2/1/ == kba . All the points on the right of line fulfill 
the condition.    
 The MFR contains all the possible values for both 1s  and 2s  that – for a given value 
of δ - allow for contest management. The contest management scenario paves the way for 
match-fixing. In such a case, both teams will prefer the contest management scenario to the 
pure contest scenario. It does appear clear that as the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake 
decreases (namely as 1→δ ) the value of the proportional concessions needed to establish a 
MFR increase. To better understand the graph consider also an arbitrarily-fixed value as 
25.=δ . In such a case, in order to have a MFR, 44.1 ≥s and 49.172 −≥s  respectively. Since 
( )1,02 ∈s  this would mean that team 2 – namely the team with a lower evaluation of the stake 
– is not going to reward the opponent. That is, only the high-evaluation team is willing to 
make a positive transfer to the opponent. This would suffice to influence team2’s behaviour 
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towards manage the contest – that is to fix the match.  The table 1 below presents a simple 
numerical example.  
 
TABLE 1  
Numerical Example 2/1,100 == kx  
100=x  
δ   1s  2s  MFR 
    
0.15 0.12 0 ◊ 
0.25 0.44 0 ● 
0.35 0.65 0 ● 
0.5 0.80 .18 ● 
0.75 0.99 1 ◊ 
1 1 1 ◊ 
 
 
Therefore, there is a region where both teams are willing to manage the contest and perhaps 
to fix the match. As noted above, albeit the willingness to make a positive concession, for 
2/1=k if 18.<δ team 1 is not able to influence team 2’s behaviour. The remarkable point of 
interest is that there is a region where team 1 can be better off under the contest management 
scenario even if team 2 is not going to concede. The intuition behind appears to be simple. 
Since team 1 has a higher incentive to contest, it has also a higher willingness to settle 
whenever it is able to get a higher payoff. Then team 1 can influence team 2’s behaviour. 
Moreover, consider also that team 1 is weaker than the opponent ( 2/1=k ). As the 
asymmetry decreases a MFR is feasible if and only if both teams concede to the opponent. In 
the case presented above, only reciprocal concessions can create a MFR when 48.>δ .  
In practical terms, team 1 can tempt to fix the match through a transfer(concession) to 
team 2. Such a concession needs not to be a contextual monetary transfer (as in the case of 
corruption). In the presence of reciprocity concessions can be measured in different ways. 
Consider that in modern football teams meet, communicate and bargain very often. They are 
involved in leagues which organize tournaments and negotiate TV revenues redistribution. 
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They also meet and interact frequently about transfers of players. Then a concession can take 
different shapes. It can take the shape of a permanent collusive and cooperative behaviour 
between teams. Recall the story of Juventus and Avellino in 1979 last match of Italian serie 
A. This is exactly the case of a weaker team (Avellino) willing to concede to a stronger team 
(Juventus). The weaker team has a higher evaluation of the stake because is under the threat 
of a relegation. In the following years, the existence of friendly relationships between the two 
teams, was confirmed by transfers of Avellino’s best young talents to Juventus.  
 However, it is also interesting the case of the high-evaluation team as the stronger 
team. This does fit with the story of West Germany and Austria in 1982 World Cup.    
TABLE 2  
Numerical Example 2/3,100 == kx  
100=x  
δ   1s  2s  MFR 
    
0.15 .12 0 ◊ 
0.25 .15 0 ● 
0.35 .42 0 ● 
0.5 .64 0 ● 
0.75 .88 .74 ● 
1 1 1 ◊ 
 
 
Whenever the high-evaluation team is also the better endowed in talent ( 1>k ) the room for a 
MFR for a grounded upon an unilateral concession seems to enlarge. However, consider first 
that the lower bound of the MFR is higher. A stronger team would rely to a larger extent on 
its own talent and ability. Then, it is willing to ‘manage the contest’ if and only if the degree 
of asymmetry reaches a reasonable level.     
This seems to fit the case of West Germany and Austria in World Cup 1982. Despite 
the loss suffered with Algeria, West Germany was still the higher-ability team. It had won the 
European Championship two years before, and West Germany was also the higher-evaluation 
team because it was under the threat of being eliminated from the World Cup.  However the 
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evaluation was not extremely asymmetric. Austria could have been eliminated if West 
Germany had won with more than 2 goals. A spontaneous match-fixing seemed to emerge. It 
was based upon reciprocal concessions. What did the Austrians concede? Fixing the match in 
favour of West Germany they renounced to compete for the first place in group. What did the 
germans concede? They actually renounced to put the maximum effort in the match. Given 
the higher ability they could have won also with more than 2 goals. Once Hrubesch scored, - 
forgive the joke with words -  German and Austrian commitment to match-fixing was entirely 
devoted to the lack-of-commitment.      
To sum up, the analysis demonstrated in a very simple way that a MFR is attainable 
when there is an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake and in particular that:  
1. there is a critical interval ( )δ*,0  where a large asymmetry in the evaluation of the 
stake does not allow for any MFR. The high-evaluation team is not willing to make 
any concession to the opponent. A MFR would not be a incentive-compatible 
scenario. Both teams get higher payoff under a ‘pure contest’, but the low-evaluation 
team would exert a very low level of efforts. The stronger is the high-evaluation team 
the larger is this interval, namely the higher the value of δ* .  I would define this 
Lack-of-Commitment Region (LCR).   
2. there is a critical interval [ ]** ,δδ  such that for [ ]** ,δδδ ∈ a MFR is attainable even 
if 02 =s . In such a case the team with the higher evaluation of the stake retains a 
higher willingness to cooperate. I would call this Match-fixing  under Unilateral 
commitment. 
3. There is a critical interval ( )1,*δ  such that for ( )1,*δδ ∈  a MFR is attainable only in 
the presence of positive reciprocal concessions. 
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In terms of policy implications, it is reasonable to think that different rules-of-the-game can 
modify the occurrence of match-fixing as an implicit collusive behaviour. This appears to be 
feasible when considering different reward systems. In particular, through them, tournament 
organizers can narrow the range of  the match-fixing region based upon unilateral 
commitment.  
 
FIFA and UEFA tournaments  
In this section I present a simple analysis of FIFA World Cup and UEFA Champions League 
tournaments. This would allow to verify whether the design of the tournament can lead to the 
mergence of a Match-Fixing scenario. The analysis will focus mainly on the possible 
emergence of match-fixing in the final stage of group phase in Champions League and World 
Cup respectively. To do this, I shall compute the bounds of a feasible match-fixing region 
under unilateral commitment, which will be denoted as MFRUC henceforth. Eventually, 
some proposals will be made in order to avoid the emergence of a match-fixing scenario.         
 
The FIFA World Cup Design 
In the FIFA World Cup at the group stage, the 32 teams are drawn into eight groups of four. 
In the group stage three points are awarded for a win, one for a draw and no points for a 
defeat. Consider also the sequence of the matches. The top-seed team will play the final 
match against the bottom-seed team of the group. Monetary rewards are extremely 
asymmetric. Each team receives CHF 2m per match in the group stage. That is, there is no 
performance bonus. Teams which qualify to the first knock-out round will receive CHF 8,5m 
each. In such a case, whenever in the final match the stronger team has to qualify could play 
against an opponent with no incentive. The match simply evolves into a contest with two 
 18
prizes. Theory of contests is clear in this respect. The high-evaluation player gets the higher 
prize whereas the underdog gets the second prize.  
 As example consider group G of World Cup 2006. The standings before the final 
matches are reproduced in the table below: 
TABLE 3 – WORLD CUP 2006, GROUP G, STANDINGS BEFORE LAST MATCHDAY 
Team W D L GF GA GD Pts 
Switzerland 1 1 0 2 0 2 6 
South Korea 1 1 0 3 2 1 4 
France 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 
Togo 0 0 2 1 4 -3 0 
W=wins; D=draws; L=lost; GS=Goals Scored; GA=Goals Against; GD=Goal Difference. 
Pts=points 
 
France was the top seed team. In the final matchday, France played against Togo the bottom-
seed team which has no possibility to qualify. It is clear that there was an extreme asymmetry 
in incentives between the two teams. The stake for France was worth CHF 8,5m whilst for 
Togo it was close to nothing.  
Consider also that FIFA changed the ranking rule. The ranking of each team in each 
group is determined taking into account: (i) greatest number of points; (ii) goal difference in 
all group matches; (iii) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches. If two or more 
teams are equal on the basis of the foregoing criteria then they are ranked according to (iv) 
greatest number of points obtained in the group matches between the teams concerned; (v) 
goal difference resulting from the group matches between the teams concerned; (vi) greater 
number of goals scored in all group matches between the teams concerned;  (vii) lottery. That 
is, FIFA changed the rule which assigned higher priority to head-to-head results when 
resolving ties during the group phase of the tournament. A superior reliance on number of 
goals probably favours the high-abilities teams which in the last match against a weaker team 
can try to fill a gap in the final standings. The design of the group phase seems to favour the 
top-seed teams. Albeit the 1982 scandal, top-seed teams have still an advantage in world cup 
 19
tournaments. As anecdotal evidence consider that in world cup 2006 no top-seed team failed 
the qualification.  
I present hereafter a tentative application of the model to FIFA world cup. Table 4 
below reports the results of the model for the last match of group phase. Some remarks are 
needed to explain the values used in the estimated model. The abilities have been computed 
through the FIFA ranking released in May 2006.  In particular it had been augmented in order 
to consider some peculiarities. Recall that in December 2005 FIFA itself did not apply 
exactly the FIFA rankings to create the groups for the draw. Then I slightly modified the 
FIFA rankings in order to capture the impact of ‘experience’ and history in world cups as 
well as a ‘bonus’ for team which already won the world cup in the past. In order to capture 
the impact of experience and history I added the points each team obtained in the foregoing 
world cups plus one. To teams which had not obtained any point in foregoing world cups I 
(arbitrarily) assigned 1 point. Data on points obtained in the foregoing editions of world cup 
have been extracted from Torgler (2006).  Moreover, an arbitrary bonus of 25 points has been 
assigned for every world cup and a bonus of 5 points to European teams. These latter points 
has been attributed because of the anecdotal evidence that no South American team has won 
a world cup organised in Europe. Then, the FIFA ranking 
becomes: EWSPtsFIFAR iiii +++= . For instance, Brazil, leader in FIFA ranking with 827 
points, had received a bonus of 100 points for past wins as well as 142 additional points. The 
interesting point is that – with the exception of Mexico – the top-seed teams chosen by FIFA 
in December 2005 stand in the first seven places of this augmented ranking.   
 To evaluate the stake of the match recall that each team receives CHF 2m per match 
in the group stage. Teams which qualify to the first knock-out round receives CHF 8.5m 
each. That is, a match for a team which has to qualify is worth CHF 8.5m. The stake is worth 
almost zero for teams which already qualified or cannot qualify. However, it must be 
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considered that teams attach an individual value to the stake because of national cash-
incentive. This kind of bonus-schemes widely differ. In general players of top teams are 
promised a large cash-amount based upon performance, but the bonus scheme does not start 
until the quarter-finals of the competition. There could be also different mechanisms of 
internal redistribution within teams. For example the Czech Republic and Croatia announced 
to redistribute prize money promised by FIFA to the countries' football associations, in an 
80:20 split between players and coaches. Many countries keep the precise details of world 
cup bonuses a secret. Being unable to collect these data I attach an arbitrary value of CHF 
500,000 per match to teams having a stake equal to zero according to FIFA reward system.      
TABLE 4 - WORLD CUP 2006, LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE 
  1x   2x   δ   a   b  k   MFRUC bounds  PMF 
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
Poland Costa Rica 500 500 1 717 605 1.19   ◊ 
Germany Ecuador 500 500 1 900 634 1.42   ◊ 
Paraguay Trinidad & Tobago 8500 500 0.06 672 605 1.11 0.05 0.55 ● 
England Sweden 8500 500 0.06 833 757 1.10 0.05 0.55 ● 
Angola Iran 500 500 1 582 690 0.84   ◊ 
Portugal Mexico 500 500 1 771 792 0.97   ◊ 
Argentina Holland 500 500 1 919 811 1.13   ◊ 
Ivory Coast Serbia 500 500 1 671 656 1.02   ◊ 
Italy Czech Republic 8500 8500 1 905 805 1.12   ◊ 
Ghana USA 8500 8500 1 601 773 0.78   ◊ 
Croatia Australia 8500 8500 1 705 613 1.15   ◊ 
Brazil Japan 500 500 1 1069 713 1.50   ◊ 
Spain Saudi Arabia 500 500 1 816 657 1.24   ◊ 
Ucraine Tunisia 8500 8500 1 615 699 0.88   ◊ 
Switzerland South Korea 8500 500 0,06 671 695 0.97 0.05 0.54 ● 
France Togo 8500 500 0,06 829 570 1.45 0.055 0.57 ● 
 
In the last matchday four out of sixteen matches are susceptible of match-fixing. In particular, 
the table presents lower and upper bounds (critical values of δ ) of a potential MFR with 
unilateral commitment (MFRUC). Bold notations denote the feasible emergence of match-
fixing. Of course the results are sensitive to the arbitrary value chosen. However, given the 
extreme asymmetry in evaluations of the stake, it is clear that if no arbitrary value is 
attributed, there would be a Lack-of-commitment region. Consider also that even if there is 
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no asymmetry ( 1=δ ) the design of the competition seems to favour high seed teams. 
According to (10) and (11) in the presence of equal evaluation the probability of winning will 
depend upon only the level of abilities. At the same time the lower is the stake the lower is 
the level of efforts expended in a match by both teams. Then, the absence of performances 
bonuses and an extreme asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to lack of 
commitment and match-fixing.  
Consider an alternative mechanism. First recall that the total prize money to be 
awarded by FIFA for each group amounts to CHF 45 million. Imagine that each team 
receives CHF 1 m for each match played plus a performance bonus of CHF 2m for each win 
(CHF 1m for a draw). Imagine also that teams qualifying for the round of sixteen will each 
earn CHF 3,5 million. The total prize money would be slightly lower (43m). The table would 
become: 
TABLE 5 - WORLD CUP 2006, LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE, A PROPOSED DESIGN 
  1x   2x   δ   a   b  k   MFRUC bounds PMF 
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
Poland Costa Rica 2000 2000 1 717 605 1.19   ◊ 
Germany Ecuador 2000 2000 1 900 634 1.42   ◊ 
Paraguay Trinidad & Tobago 3500 2000 0.6 672 605 1.11 0.05 0.55 ◊ 
England Sweden 3500 2000 0.6 833 757 1.10 0.05 0.55 ◊ 
Angola Iran 2000 2000 1 582 690 0.84   ◊ 
Portugal Mexico 2000 2000 1 771 792 0.97   ◊ 
Argentina Holland 2000 2000 1 919 811 1.13   ◊ 
Ivory Coast Serbia 2000 2000 1 671 656 1.02   ◊ 
Italy Czech Republic 3500 3500 1 905 805 1.12   ◊ 
Ghana USA 3500 3500 1 601 773 0.78   ◊ 
Croatia Australia 3500 3500 1 705 613 1.15   ◊ 
Brazil Japan 2000 2000 1 1069 713 1.50   ◊ 
Spain Saudi Arabia 2000 2000 1 816 657 1.24   ◊ 
Ucraine Tunisia 3500 3500 1 615 699 0.88   ◊ 
Switzerland South Korea 3500 2000 0.6 671 695 0.97 0.05 0.54 ◊ 
France Togo 3500 2000 0.6 829 570 1.45 0.055 0.57 ◊ 
     
As it is clear, the room for an unilateral commitment match-fixing disappears. Moreover, 
given the existence of a performance bonus the total amount of efforts expended would be 
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higher. Then, for FIFA World Cup, re-allocating resources from participation bonuses to 
performance bonuses appears to be a desirable policy.   
 
The UEFA Champions League Design 
Champions League is the top football tournament in Europe. At the group stage, the 32 clubs 
are drawn into eight groups of four. These groups are formed by means of a draw. For the 
purpose of the draw, the 32 clubs are divided into four groups of eight. Such a division is 
based upon the existing rankings of teams before the start of competition. In fact, each team 
is ranked by means of a combination of 33% of the value of the respective national 
association’s coefficient for the five years before the start of competition and the team 
individual performances in UEFA club competitions during the same period. Then clubs are 
divided into four groups of eights in accordance with their rankings. Therefore, there are 
eight top-seed clubs. 
Each club plays one home and one away match against each other club. The sequence 
of the matches is really a remarkable point. In fact, the top seed club in thee final match will 
play away against the second-seed club of the group. Consider 2005/2006 tournament. 
Liverpool, as title-holder, was the top-seed of its group. Then it played the last match of the 
group stage against Chelsea which was the second seed of the group.  
In the group stage three points are awarded for a win, one for a draw and no points for 
a defeat. If two or more teams are equal on points the final rankings will be determined 
according (i) the higher number of points obtained in the matches played among the teams in 
question; (ii) superior goal difference in the matches played among the teams in question; (iii) 
higher number of goals scored away in the aforementioned matches; (iv) superior goal 
difference from all group matches played; (v) higher number of goals scored. There are also 
 23
monetary rewards. In particular, teams receive CHF 500,000 for a win and CHF 250,000 for 
a draw. Teams which qualify for the first knock-out round receive CHF 2.5m each.  
As example consider again the 2005/2006 tournament. In the group D the standings 
before the final matches are reproduced in the table below: 
TABLE 6 – CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2005/ 2006, GROUP D, STANDINGS BEFORE LAST MATCHDAY 
         
  W D L GS GA GD PTS. 
Villareal  1 4 0 2 1 1 7 
Lille  1 2 2 3 4 -1 6 
Manchester United 1 3 1 1 2 -1 6 
Benfica  1 3 1 2 3 -1 5 
W=wins; D=draws; L=lost; GS=Goals Scored; GA=Goals Against; GD=Goal Difference. PTS=points 
     
The final matches were Villareal-Lille and Benfica-Manchester United. Please note 
that the top-seed club of the group was Manchester United. It went to play the final match in 
Portugal. In such a situation, it is clear that all teams can qualify. Then, all clubs contested a 
stake worth CHF 3m. In such a case, there is no room for unilateral match-fixing.   
Consider now a tentative application of the model to the UEFA Champions League. 
In such a case, The UEFA team ranking of previous season have been used as proxy to 
determine the abilities of teams involved. Of course, this also sounds as arbitrary. UEFA 
points are computed upon results of the previous season. Abilities of teams change through 
transfers of players and then they differ with respect to the previous season. However, it 
would be quite impossible to find a measure of abilities for all teams involved in Champions 
League. At the same time – especially for top seed teams – abilities do not change 
dramatically and  ‘history matters’. The more experienced teams have also at their disposal 
the more experienced players. And this is a factor that makes the rankings quite stable across 
years for top seed teams. The tables below present the matches of the last round-up in the 
group phase in 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 respectively.       
TABLE 7- CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2005/2006 LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE  
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
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 1x  2x  δ  a  b  k  MFRUC bounds PMF 
AC Milan* Schalke 3000 3000 1 31,62 13,49 2.34   ◊ 
PSV* Fenerbhance 3000 500 0.2 24,96 10,77 2.32 0.091 0.6 ● 
Juventus FC Rapid Vienna* 500 500 1 23,62 3,52 6.72   ◊ 
Bayern Brugge* 500 500 1 19,49 10,02 1.94   ◊ 
Arsenal* Ajax 500 500 1 19,14 11,96 1.60   ◊ 
Villareal Lille 3000 3000 1 22,10 16,77 1.32   ◊ 
Manchester United Benfica* 3000 3000 1 17,14 13,70 1.25   ◊ 
Lyon* Rosenborg 500 500 1 23,77 6,16 3.86   ◊ 
Olympiakos* Real Madrid 500 500 1 16,04 18,10 0.89   ◊ 
Real Betis* Anderlecht 500 500 1 4,10 5,02 0.82   ◊ 
Chelsea* Liverpool 500 500 1 25,14 30,14 0.83   ◊ 
Rangers* Inter 3000 500 0.2 7,57 22,62 0.33 0.048 0.425 ● 
Porto Artmedia* 3000 3000 1 13,70 1,44 9.51   ◊ 
Udinese* Barcelona 3000 500 0.2 6,62 17,10 0.39 0.05 0.44 ● 
Werder Bremen* Panathinaikos 3000 500 0.2 16,49 14,04 1.17 0.073 0.56 ● 
Notes: * Home Team      
TABLE 8- CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2006/2007 LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE  
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
 1x  2x  δ  a   k  MFRUC bounds PMF 
Chelsea* Sofia 500 500 1 17,76 17,89 0,99   ◊ 
Liverpool Galatasaray* 500 500 1 17,76 2,32 7,66   ◊ 
PSV* Bordauex 500 500 1 13,50 3,57 3,78   ◊ 
Barcelona* Werder Bremen 3000 3000 1 34,16 14,44 2,37   ◊ 
Bayern* Inter 500 500 1 17,44 24,07 0,72   ◊ 
Shaktar Donestz Olympiakos* 3000 500 0.2 12,90 5,16 2,50 0.09 0.61 ● 
Roma* Valencia 3000 500 0.2 19,07 5,16 3,69 0.11 0.62 ● 
Sporting Lisbon* Spartak Moscow 500 500 1 3,82 3,30 1,16   ◊ 
Dinamo Kiev* Real Madrid 500 500 1 1,90 17,16 0,11   ◊ 
Lyon* Steaua Bucuresti 500 500 1 24,57 26,56 0,93   ◊ 
Lille Ac Milan* 3000 500 0.2 16,57 26,08 0,64 0.06 0.5 ● 
Celtic FC Copenaghen* 500 500 1 1,40 2,16 0,65   ◊ 
FC Porto* Arsenal 3000 500 0.2 8,82 31,76 0,28 0,04 0.4 ● 
CSKA Moscow Hamburger SV* 3000 500 0.2 10,30 16,44 0,63 0.06 0.5 ● 
Manchester United* Benefica 3000 3000 1 12,76 17,82 0,72   ◊ 
AEK Athens SC Anderlecht* 3000 500 0.2 2,10 6,82 0,31 0.05 0.42 ● 
Notes: * Home Team 
 
Monetary stakes are based upon UEFA 2005/2006 reward system. Teams which had 
to qualify for the first knock-out round have a stake of KCHF 2500 (minimum value for 
qualification) + KCHF 500 (performance bonus). Also in this case some matches are at risk 
of match-fixing.  
 Then, also in this case, a tentative proposal could involve a superior reliance on 
performance bonus. According to the UEFA financial report 2005/2006,  176,000 KCHF 
have been distributed as participation bonus and match bonus (KCHF 80,000+KCHF 
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96,000). The amount of performance bonus was 48,000 KCHF. Imagine now to devote most 
resources to performance bonuses, namely match bonuses. Rewarding a 1800 KCHF for a 
win (900 KCHF for a draw) the total amount to be distributed in the group phase (in 96 
matches) would be 172,800 KCHF. In particular, imagine also a reduction of prize for clubs 
qualifying for the first knock-out round from 2500 KCHF to 2000 KCHF. Then, teams which 
have to qualify for the first knock-out round would have a stake of KCHF 2000 (minimum 
value for qualification) + KCHF 1800 (performance bonus), whereas teams competing only 
for the last match performance bonus would consider only the latter prize. In formal terms, 
the value of δ would move towards the unity, namely at a lower degree of asymmetry in the 
evaluation between contestants. As showed in the modified tables, also in this case the 
number of matches at risk of match-fixing would decrease. At the same time a higher stake 
would increase the level of total efforts exerted in the match. Eventually, teams which have to 
qualify are also able to get a higher payoff because their stake increases from 3000 KCHF to 
3800 KCHF.   
TABLE 9- CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2005/2006 LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE, AN ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
 1x  2x  δ  a  b  k  MFRUC bounds PMF 
AC Milan* Schalke 3800 3800 1 31.62 13.49 2.34   ◊ 
PSV* Fenerbhance 3800 1800 0.47 24.96 10.77 2.32 0.091 0.6 ● 
Juventus FC Rapid Vienna* 1800 1800 1 23.62 3.52 6.72   ◊ 
Bayern Brugge* 1800 1800 1 19.49 10.02 1.94   ◊ 
Arsenal* Ajax 1800 1800 1 19.14 11.96 1.60   ◊ 
Villareal Lille 3800 3800 1 22.10 16.77 1.32   ◊ 
Manchester United Benfica* 3800 3800 1 17.14 13.70 1.25   ◊ 
Lyon* Rosenborg 1800 1800 1 23.77 6.16 3.86   ◊ 
Olympiakos* Real Madrid 1800 1800 1 16.04 18.10 0.89   ◊ 
Real Betis* Anderlecht 1800 1800 1 4.10 5.02 0.82   ◊ 
Chelsea* Liverpool 1800 1800 1 25.14 30.14 0.83   ◊ 
Rangers* Inter 3800 1800 0.47 7.57 22.62 0.33 0.048 0.425 ◊ 
Porto Artmedia* 3800 3800 1 13.70 1.44 9.51   ◊ 
Udinese* Barcelona 3800 1800 0.47 6.62 17.10 0.39 0.05 0.44 ◊ 
Werder Bremen* Panathinaikos 3800 1800 0.47 16.49 14.04 1.17 0.073 0.56 ● 
Notes: * Home Team      
 
TABLE 10- CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 2005/2006 LAST MATCHDAY, GROUP PHASE,  AN ALTERNATIVE DESIGN 
(Monetary stakes are expressed in Thousands of CHF) 
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 1x  2x  δ  a  b  k  MFRUC bounds PMF 
Chelsea* Sofia 1800 1800 1 17.76 17.89 0.99   ◊ 
Liverpool Galatasaray* 1800 1800 1 17.76 2.32 7.66   ◊ 
PSV* Bordauex 1800 1800 1 13.50 3.57 3.78   ◊ 
Barcelona* Werder Bremen 3800 3800 1 34.16 14.44 2.37   ◊ 
Bayern* Inter 1800 1800 1 17.44 24.07 0.72   ◊ 
Shaktar Donestz Olympiakos* 3800 1800 0.47 12.90 5.16 2.50 0.09 0,61 ● 
Roma* Valencia 3800 1800 0.47 19.07 5.16 3.69 0.11 0,62 ● 
Sporting Lisbon* Spartak Moscow 1800 1800 1 3.82 3.30 1.16   ◊ 
Dinamo Kiev* Real Madrid 1800 1800 1 1.90 17.16 0.11   ◊ 
Lyon* Steaua Bucuresti 1800 1800 1 24.57 26.56 0.93   ◊ 
Lille Ac Milan* 3800 1800 0.47 16.57 26.08 0.64 0.06 0,5 ● 
Celtic FC Copenaghen* 1800 1800 1 1.40 2.16 0.65   ◊ 
FC Porto* Arsenal 3800 1800 0.47 8.82 31.76 0.28 0.04 0,4 ◊ 
CSKA Moscow Hamburger SV* 3800 1800 0.47 10.30 16.44 0.63 0.06 0,5 ● 
Manchester United* Benfica 3800 3800 1 12.76 17.82 0.72   ◊ 
AEK Athens SC Anderlecht* 3800 1800 0.47 2.10 6.82 0.31 0.05 0,42 ◊ 
Notes: * Home Team 
 
However, proposing a different reward system for UEFA Champions League could be also 
useless. In fact, UEFA through its reward system redistributes only half of the monetary 
amount available. According to UEFA financial report, in 2005/2006 edition the net amount 
of CHF 677m  available to the clubs has been split into a fixed amount of CHF 338,5m 
(starting bonuses, performance bonuses, match bonuses) and a variable amount of CHF 
338,5m (market pool). The market pool balance is to be distributed according to the value of 
each TV market represented by clubs taking part in UEFA champions league and split among 
the number of teams. Such a split has been done according to (i) the performance in the 
previous domestic league championship; (ii) the number of matches played by each team in 
2005/2006 champions league. The table reports the revenues of teams involved in Champions 
League 2005/2006. 
 TABLE 11 - TOTAL REVENUES FOR TEAMS IN CHAMPIONS 
LEAGUE 2005/2006 
   
Total 
Revenue 
Market 
Pool 
%market 
Pool 
(data expressed in thousands of CHF) 
Chelsea  38662 28084 72.64 
Lille  24995 17667 70.68 
Schalke  23097 15519 67.19 
Manchester 
United* 21689 14361 66,21 
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Bayern*  31104 20276 65.19 
Lyon*  39490 25162 63.72 
Liverpool*  27742 16914 60.97 
Werder Bremen 23874 14046 58,83 
Real Madrid* 24610 14282 58,03 
Arsenal*  54327 29999 55.22 
Real Betis 15919 8591 53,97 
Juventus FC* 29460 15382 52,21 
Rangers  20006 9928 49.63 
Udinese  14469 7141 49.35 
Fenerbhace 13010 6182 47,52 
AC Milan*  31862 14284 44.83 
Villareal  30518 12940 42.40 
Barcelona*  49061 20733 42.26 
Inter*  23411 9583 40.93 
Olympiakos 11533 4705 40,80 
PSV*  17411 7083 40.68 
Panathinaikos 11085 4257 38,40 
Ajax*  16987 6409 37.73 
Rosenborg 10448 3620 34,65 
Rapid Vienna 7964 1886 23,68 
Anderlecht 8425 1847 21,92 
Brugge  9369 2041 21.78 
Porto*  8309 1231 14.82 
Benfica  14831 1753 11.82 
Artmedia  7526 198 2.63 
 Source: UEFA Financial Report 2005/2006; * member of G14 
 
The figures show unambiguously how the share of TV revenues is extremely 
significant for some clubs. However, this reward system clearly favours the most important 
teams. Domestic champions get the ‘lion’s share’ of TV revenues. At the moment, reforming 
such a mechanism does not seem simple. Recall that leading clubs in Europe founded in 2000 
a pressure group called G14. Ten out of top-15 earners in 2005/2006 are members of this 
pressure group. In general, the evaluation each team attaches to the stake can be really 
different from the monetary performance bonuses rewarded by UEFA. In fact, since a share 
of TV revenues are redistributed in proportion to the number of matches played, qualification 
to the first knock-out round can be more valued.    
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
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To sum up, the theoretical model demonstrated in a very simple way that a MFR is attainable 
in the presence of an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake and in particular that: (i) there 
is a critical interval ( )δ*,0  where a large asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake does not 
allow for any MFR. The high-evaluation team is not willing to make any concession to the 
opponent. They both prefer the ‘pure contest’ scenario, but the low-evaluation team would 
exert a very low level of efforts. I defined this Lack-of-Commitment Region (LCR); (ii) there 
is a critical interval [ ]** ,δδ  such that for [ ]** ,δδδ ∈ a MFR is attainable even if 02 =s , that 
is even if the low-evaluation team does not concede. In such a case the team with the higher 
evaluation of the stake retains a higher willingness to collude and fix the match. I would call 
this Match-fixing  under Unilateral commitment. (iii)There is a critical interval ( )1,*δ  such 
that for ( )1,*δδ ∈  a MFR is attainable only in the presence of positive reciprocal concessions. 
The model suggests that reducing the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake could be a 
desirable policy. Incentives to collude (to fix the matches) should be lower.    
Then, the model has been applied to assess UEFA and FIFA tournaments. In order to 
reduce the asymmetry in the evaluation of stake, a wider reliance on performance bonuses 
has been proposed. The proposed redistribution of monetary prizes confirms this idea. In both 
tournaments, the number of matches at risk of match-fixing decreases. In general, it could be 
maintained that a system more focused on performance bonuses would work in favour of a 
high uncertainty of outcome. Therefore, re-allocating financial resources to monetary prizes 
as performance bonuses would be the key to avoid (or reduce) the emergence of match-
fixing. Another desirable benign impact could be a higher level of total efforts. That is, a 
system more focused on performance bonuses would also lead to a higher level of exerted 
efforts which are increasing in the level of the stake.   
In the absence of a performance bonus – as in the FIFA design – a football match is 
akin to a contest with two prizes. In fact, a participation bonus with no performance bonus 
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lead weaker team to exert less efforts. Then, even if FIFA tournament design seems to be less 
prone to match-fixing, it is more prone to a widespread lack-of-commitment in the last 
matchday. Moreover, apart from the asymmetry in monetary rewards, this is also due to the 
scheduling of the matches. As noted above, in the FIFA system the schedule of matches also 
works in favour of top-seed teams. Even if FIFA changed the rules after the 1982 West 
Germany – Austria scandal, it remained biased in favour of top-seed teams. The example of 
France - Togo in 2006 World Cup is clear in this respect. The combination of a high 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake and the scheduling of the matches is highly 
distortionary. It leads the low-seed teams to exert less efforts. Instead, the Champions League 
tournament is not biased in this sense. In fact, the top seed club in the final match will play 
away against the second-seed club of the group.  
However, UEFA Champions League is still biased in favour of top-seed teams 
because of the ‘lion’s share’ of most important teams in redistribution of TV revenues. This 
of course, strongly modify evaluations of participating teams.    
The analysis focused on a match-fixing region under unilateral commitment. Of 
course this is also questionable. Also in the presence of a very similar evaluation teams can 
collude. But this seems to work only in the presence of reciprocal concessions. In such a case, 
it would be close to the occurrence and sustaining of collusion in repeated play games. And 
this appears to be simply feasible in a domestic league. By contrast, for both FIFA and UEFA 
tournaments  where teams may meet only once in several years, narrowing the asymmetry in 
the evaluation by means of different rules-of-the-game seems to be a desirable policy.  
However, a crucial point – which could be the object of a future research - is related to 
the redistribution of monetary prizes within teams. The implicit assumption behind this paper 
was that all players agree on an evaluation of the stake. This clearly occurs when the team 
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managers redistribute entirely the monetary prizes to the players. With no redistribution, 
efforts exerted by players can change dramatically.   
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